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Abstract
There is a widespread movement today to prepare all students for college, and it is promoted in the
name of democracy. I argue here that such a move actually puts our democracy at risk by forcing students into programs that do not interest them and depriving them of courses at which they might succeed. We risk losing the vision of democracy that respects every form of honest work and cultivates a
deep appreciation of interdependence.

hould all children go to college? There are those
who insist that the current dedication to preparing all
students for college is inspired by democratic ideals. I
will argue here that such a move actually puts our democracy at
risk. We risk losing what might be called the Whitmanesque vision
of democracy—a democracy that respects every form of honest
work, includes people from every economic and social class, and
cultivates a deep understanding of interdependence.

Conflicting Views on Democracy and Education
One view, made popular by Mortimer Adler, holds that democracy
requires equal education for all children through high school, and
by equal Adler meant the same. He wrote:
We should have a one-track system of schooling, not a system with two
or more tracks, only one of which goes straight ahead while the others
shunt the young off onto sidetracks not headed toward the goals our
society opens for all (1982, p. 5).

Adler’s objections to tracking have been echoed by many
educational researchers and writers today, although some—
perhaps most—do not advocate the specific one-track curriculum
he prescribed. In the discussion that follows it will be important to
distinguish between two senses of tracks and tracking. In one sense,
when we talk about tracks, we refer to different programs such as
academic (or college preparatory), vocational/industrial, and
commercial. I will offer a strong defense for this form of tracking.
In a second sense, we refer to the practice of assigning students to
classes composed by ability groups. I won’t say much about this
form of tracking here, but I will suggest that, if the first form were
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wisely designed and implemented, the second form could be
reasonably recast in terms of interest rather than ability.
Current writers who oppose tracking (both forms) make a
powerful argument, and it is almost frightening to suggest that they
may be mistaken (Nieto, 1999; Oakes, 1995; Spring, 2000). I argue that
the idea of providing different programs (or tracks) for different talents
and interests is a good one, fully compatible with social justice. It is the
implementation of the idea that has gone badly wrong. I agree
wholeheartedly with the opponents of tracking who claim that poor
and minority students have been shoved into dead-end courses and,
thus, deprived of anything close to equal opportunity. But different
programs need not differ in quality, and forcing everyone—regardless
of interest or talent—into one program is hardly democratic.
The concern that I want to explore in some depth was well
expressed early in the twentieth century by Charles Eliot, when he
was president of Harvard. He warned:
If democracy means to try to make all children equal or all men equal,
it means to fight nature, and in that fight democracy is sure to be
defeated. There is no such thing among men as equality of nature, of
capacity for training, or of intellectual power. (National Society for the
Promotion of Industrial Education, 1908, p. 13)

The point that I want to emphasize builds on Eliot’s comment
that “democracy is sure to be defeated.” The comment is
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particularly interesting because Eliot’s defense of different tracks
and electives represented a sharp turnaround from his earlier
advocacy of the classical education recommended by the
Committee of Ten (which he had chaired). During the period from
about 1890 to 1910, there were strong voices urging that high school
education be extended to all children. This seemed necessary to
many for two reasons: first, the enormous influx of immigrants
created a need for increased citizenship education and second, the
nation was moving away from an agricultural economy toward one
based on industry. To produce good citizens and workers the
country needed to expand education. But there were equally strong
voices warning that many children were simply not capable of the
academic work that defined high schools—classical academies—of
the time.
Both groups were right. Democracy demanded the extension
of secondary schooling to all children and most children were at
that time incapable or uninterested in the traditional secondary
education. What was to be done? The answer was ingenious: the
comprehensive high school was created. The public was persuaded
that this new school would offer useful courses that would help
graduates to get jobs in the new industrial society and not just
studies for future professors, preachers, and enlightened housewives. The comprehensive high school, denigrated by traditionalists then and now, made American education a model for the
world. High school education grew rapidly. By 1970, the high
school graduation rate had climbed to more than 75% from its 1900
mark of 6%. This was a remarkable achievement.
Complaints against the comprehensive high school never
disappeared, but they were stronger in some years than others. In
the period following World War II, the objections raised against
progressive education (and the comprehensive high school)
reached a high point. Echoing the Committee of Ten, Arthur
Bestor claimed that all students should follow the sort of program
laid down by the Committee, and he made his recommendations
with reference to the demands of democracy. He vigorously denied
that intellectual capacity was somehow lacking or diminished at
lower economic levels (Angus & Mirel, 1999; Kliebard, 1995). The
purpose of the school, he insisted, was to promote intellectual
growth. Everything else should be subordinated to this goal. As we
have noted, Mortimer Adler argued anew for the same claim thirty
years later.
Without denying that intellectual growth is an important aim
of education, we might respond to Bestor and Adler that other
aims are equally important and that the achievement of intellectual
goals is closely related to—perhaps even dependent on—the
achievement of these other aims. Further, we might object to
defining intellectual content as Bestor and Adler did—as a set of
traditionally defined subjects long thought to be central to college
preparation. Notice that we may agree with Bestor and today’s
opponents of tracking that intellectual capacity is not confined to
one socioeconomic group, race, ethnicity, or gender, but still insist
that talents and interests differ across individuals. And we might
also insist that the intellectual should not be narrowly defined in
terms of traditional subjects such as algebra or history. So much
hinges on this that we must address it directly if briefly.
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Confusion Over the Intellectual
John Dewey made it clear repeatedly that no subject is inherently
more intellectual than another (1916), and I have also made that
argument in several places (Noddings, 1992, 2003, 2007). If we
identify the intellectual with thinking, the algebra taught in
schools is not inherently more intellectual than cooking or
motorcycle repair. Calvin Woodward made the argument even
before Dewey, referring to young workers in a forging-shop as
“young Vulcans, bare-armed, leather-aproned with many a drop
of an honest sweat . . . They are using their brains and hands”
(Kliebard, 1999).
Today, Mike Rose has reminded us that thinking and doing
are mutually supportive, tightly connected activities. No useful
activity or preparation for an occupation involving hands-on work
need be simply manual labor; such work can be taught and learned
intelligently, and classroom discussion can move beyond specific
doings to matters of citizenship, mutual respect, and prospects for
a satisfying personal life (Rose, 1995, 2005). Rose connected his
discussion to the meaning of democracy and the centrality of
respect in a growing, evolving democracy. In such a democracy—
we might call it Whitmanesque —honest workers are worthy of
respect. One should not need a college degree to earn respect
(Dewey, 1927, p. 184).
We should note, however, that Rose has recently expressed
concern that his appreciative appraisal of the mind at work might
be used to launch a renewed effort to direct minority and low-SES
students away from college preparatory courses and into vocational programs. I share that concern, and I’ll say more about it a
bit later. But I have an even greater concern and that centers on the
high school dropout rate. We may comfort ourselves by bragging
that we now prepare all students for college, but we lose a huge
number before high school graduation. Keep in mind also that my
enthusiasm for vocational education rests on two essential
premises: first, that we will get to work seriously in creating rich
and relevant vocational programs and, second, that we will provide
extensive counseling and mentoring services so that students can
make intelligent choices of program. If those premises are denied
or ignored, I might unhappily join my antitracking colleagues and
do my best to stuff algebra into everyone. Well, no, as an old math
teacher, I probably couldn’t go that far. But I would roll up my
sleeves and work with enlightened math educators to create a
college-acceptable substitute for traditional algebra (Hersh &
John-Steiner, 2011; Jacobs, 1970).
Whatever we devise by way of courses and programs, our
products should be intellectually rich, and we should make it clear
that the truly intellectual is closely related to the moral. In contrast
to both those who identify the intellectual with some form of pure
thinking and those who sharply separate the intellectual from the
moral, Matthew Crawford insisted that the two are intimately
connected:
Any discipline that deals with an authoritative, independent reality
requires honesty and humility. I believe this is especially so of the
stochastic arts that fix things, such as doctoring and wrenching, in
which we are not the makers of the things we tend. (2009, p. 100)
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In describing the intellectual dimension of a good mechanic’s work,
Crawford sees a set of virtues that connect that worker to the moral
world of reality. The motorcycle mechanic must identify possible
alternatives in his recommendations for repair, consider his client’s
resources and the purposes for which the client intends to use the
motorcycle, and report honestly on his analysis.
Miles Horton, too, in his work at Highlander School, saw the
connection between the intellectual and the moral. Working,
hiking, thinking, Horton struggled with the ideas of communism
and socialism. He struggled with pacifism and its limits in advancing the good. He was clearly a well-read intellectual, but he built his
life and work with working-class people and, like Paulo Freire, he
believed that social justice must be achieved “with people from the
bottom, who could change society from the bottom” (1998, p. 44).
It is worth mentioning also that the philosopher Charles
Sanders Peirce claimed a moral base for intellectual-scientific
work. A scientist must be dedicated to the truth if he or she is to
find it, and science requires commitment to continued inquiry.
Thus, genuine intellectual inquiry rests on a moral foundation.
One does not shut out objections to one’s own position but renews
inquiry in an attempt to resolve the problem and get at the truth
(Thompson, 1963).
Some might argue that there are lines of work—in the
financial world, for example—that do not seem to rest on a moral
base and yet require vigorous mental activity. But, clearly, any work
that has possible effects on the well-being of others has a moral
dimension. We can recognize the mental acuity of financial wizards
who betray or ignore the welfare of others, but we should hesitate to
label their machinations as intellectual. Perhaps it is a matter of
linguistic choice. Should we think of Professor Moriarity as a
wicked intellectual or as a mental genius whose intellectual
development was impaired?
In that spirit, we should admit that there are respectable
thinkers who argue strongly that the intellectual is often rightly
detached from the moral and even from empirical reality. The
mathematician G. H. Hardy is said to have declared (bragged?), “I
have never done anything ‘useful’” (Newman, 1956, p. 2026). Hardy
(knowing that his proclaimed uselessness was nonsense in the eyes
of the world) described himself as a maker of patterns composed of
ideas. The patterns, he said, must be beautiful, and the significance
of a mathematical theorem lies not in its practical consequences but
in its beauty and seriousness. For Hardy, the intellectual cannot be
identified with the trivial even if the trivial is called algebra. This
reminds us that the intellectual has an aesthetic dimension. When
there are no obvious real-world or human consequences of the
work in question, judgment of its value focuses on its effects on the
field of study and/or its beauty.
Some scientific work, separated from the empirical world,
would pass both Peirce’s moral test (truth is scrupulously pursued)
and Hardy’s aesthetic test (the results are beautiful and advance the
field), but induce moral consternation when connected to the real
world. Consider the moral agonies of Einstein, Oppenheimer, and
other scientists involved in the development of the atomic bomb.
We should also recognize that intellectual work varies with
respect to the objects it treats. Some intellectual work is done
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entirely with ideas and symbols; it does not require the body’s
physical participation. Other intellectual work demands the
cooperation of mind and body. Traditionally, we have made the
mistake of thinking that only the first sort of activity is properly
called intellectual. Far worse, however, we have wrongly supposed
that any sort of activity done at a desk (or computer work station) is
necessarily more intellectual than work done with the hands and
body in motion. In fact, much white-collar work performed in
cubicles is routine, sometimes mind-numbing (Crawford, 2009).
It is probably correct, however, that subjects, activities, and
occupations offer a range of potential intellectual challenge.
Usually, we consider as intellectuals those people who enter a field
that requires devotion to thinking and working with ideas and
symbols. Such work is not always directed at a specific, useful
outcome. It involves a substantial amount of play, and it grants
ardent participants considerable delight. Hardy was being honest
(if incorrect) when he said that he had never done anything useful.
As educators, we should help students to understand that intellectual work (work with ideas) does indeed offer intrinsic rewards, but
we need not elevate this work above all other forms of work that
require varying participation of the intellect.
We must also admit that some jobs are essentially mindless
and even demeaning. Digging ditches, cleaning toilets, scrubbing
pots, picking beans all day, every day, are not jobs likely to engage
the intellect. Utopian writers have long recognized the difficulty of
reconciling economic justice and respect with the demeaning,
boring nature of some necessary work. Writers as different as
Edward Bellamy and B. F. Skinner have explored the idea of utopian
societies in which such work is shared by everyone so that no one
person need spend his or her full work week in hard, dirty, mindless labor (Bellamy, 1897/1960; Skinner, 1948/1962). Others have
suggested that people who do this undesirable but necessary work
should be paid correspondingly more for their sacrifice or that
employers be compensated for hiring more low-wage workers
(Phelps, 1997).
As we plan for the future of secondary schooling, we should
abandon the notion that vocational and commercial education are
intellectually inferior to traditional academic subjects. Some
students—for a variety of reasons, all of which should be examined
sympathetically—will land in the jobs no one would choose, but
the outcome should not be an accepted result of what we provide in
schools. Every course offered by our schools should be rich in
intellectual, moral, and aesthetic content (Noddings, 2007).

Economic Concerns
Today, the most frequently heard argument for a single, traditional
track does not emphasize the intellectual content, but I’ve spent
some on it because it has been so important in the past and may be
revived in the future. Instead, the main argument for preparing all
students for college is economic. It is claimed that individuals who
earn college degrees can expect higher lifetime earnings than those
who do not, and that the nation needs more college graduates if it is
to remain competitive in the world economy. The first claim is
generally true, but there are many exceptions. Recent studies have
shown that, given the high cost of college, it takes many years
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before some graduates begin to show even a small edge in lifetime
earnings, and some never do. On the second, it is not at all clear
that increasing the number of college graduates will automatically
increase our national competitiveness. Instead, we need to educate
people well for the work they will do.
It is foolish to suppose that our economic competitiveness
depends on the number of college graduates we produce. We have
learned recently that China is suffering from an overload of college
graduates, and many young Chinese are unable to find work
commensurate with their education. It seems likely, too, that the
lower rate of unemployment among college graduates in the
United States is due at least in part to their acceptance of jobs that
do not require a college education.
In many of the most prosperous European countries, highquality vocational education and training (VET) are deemed
essential:
Countries with strong VET systems have a different conception about
learning for jobs. They make a distinction between a calling or
occupation and learning the specific skills needed to weld or solve
banking problems or manage the IT system in a corporation . . . Work
is related to active citizenship and thus education and training needed
for work are seen as the joint responsibility of the government and
what are called nicely the “social partners” (employers and labor
unions). (Hoffman, 2010, p. 1)

American educators and policymakers should renew the conversation about “callings,” finding work that is satisfying in itself, and the
connections among intellectual, moral, social, and aesthetic ideals.
In a recent letter to the editor, an angry man complained that
he could no longer compare his income with professional workers.
Now, he wrote, he could barely stay even with police and firemen.
He ended his bitter comments with this question: Why did I go to
college? Apparently, he saw only one reason for going to college—
to make more money—and he is not alone in this thinking. We
encourage it in our schools today.
The present emphasis on preparing everyone for college may
also have an entirely different sort of economic motivation; it
may not be driven entirely by a mistaken democratic commitment to social justice. Good vocational education is far more
expensive than the usual college preparatory course of study. It
requires more space, expensive equipment, smaller classes, a
specially trained faculty, and a commitment to add new equipment regularly. It is far less expensive to place all students in
regular academic courses whether or not such placement suits
them. Even if we provide extra help to assist students in passing
these courses, we are still ignoring their present and long-term
interests. We feel justified in claiming that we have provided
equal opportunity when in fact we have hurt many students
doubly: We have forced them into studies at which they do not do
well, and we have deprived them of courses at which they might
succeed. As a result, many do not graduate from high school, and
even those who do may wind up in jobs by default instead of by
choice. They may well believe that they are doing this work
because they are not good enough for anything else.
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Toward Democratic Equal Opportunity
It is reasonable to put aside claims that children are intellectually
deprived if they do not receive a college preparatory education.
On the contrary, we should recognize that many students today
are indeed intellectually short-changed by the academic program
forced on them. Many students suffer algebra courses that bear
little resemblance to the algebra that might make it possible to
study further mathematics. These unfortunate students—and
their number seems to be increasing—have algebra listed on their
transcripts, but they have learned so little that they must start all
over in community college. It is not necessarily the case that their
teachers are at fault. Indeed, many teachers present weak courses
because they do not want their students to fail, and they know
that the students would in fact fail more rigorous courses. Thus,
they concentrate on teaching well-defined skills and facts—material Whitehead (1929/1969) called “inert ideas”—and omit the
material essential to understanding. The intellectual is washed
out.
We are now at a point very like the one educators and policymakers faced in 1900. Should we prepare all children for college?
Why? When a similar question was raised in 1900 about high
school attendance, advocates had good answers to the question.
How are we answering it? One answer (heard from our current
president and at least one past president) is that we should be first
in the world in the production of college graduates. Why? We
should press this question and invite vigorous debate. For example,
do we really need more scientists? At present, we hold many young
PhDs in near servitude for years because there is no room for them
in either the academic or the industrial hierarchy. The frequently
voiced intention to be number one has become a peculiar
American mania. We would do better to concentrate on the quality
of our graduates at every level.
I think we should respond to the current question in much
the same way that Eliot and others argued in the early 20th
century. They endorsed secondary education, but they redefined
it. I am not arguing against postsecondary education—only
against defining it in terms of a traditional college education.
Further, those who can profit from postsecondary education must
first complete secondary education, and many more might do so
if they were given an opportunity to study material relevant to
their interests and talents. Schools today claim to offer equal
opportunity by forcing all students, regardless of interests, into
the same curriculum. This does not meet a democratic criterion
for equal opportunity. In a genuine democracy, choice is fundamental, and democratic education should provide opportunities
for intelligent, guided choice.
Some thoughtful critics of the approach I suggest object that
teenagers are too young to make decisions that may affect their
futures dramatically. However, I am not suggesting that young
students be allowed to do as they please without guidance. And,
in agreement with colleagues who wish to end tracking, I am
opposed to assigning youngsters to tracks. The choice must be
made collaboratively: counselors sharing what is revealed by
tests, grades, former teachers’ comments, and records; students
sharing their hopes and dreams for the future. By counselors here
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I mean teachers, parents, and community mentors, as well as
professional counselors; such counseling should begin early and
be continuous. Moreover, if a student insists on enrolling in the
college-preparatory program despite a poor prognosis, he or she
should be allowed to do so. Every effort should be made to find a
program suited to the student’s talents, interests, and willingness
to persevere. John Dewey spoke on the need for this forwardlooking, reflective process:
To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do
it is the key to happiness. Nothing is more tragic than failure to
discover one’s true business in life, or to find that one has drifted or
been forced by circumstances into an uncongenial calling. (1916, p. 308)

A choice made at the level of high school should, of
course, be reversible. These days, middle-aged workers often
change their professions, and teenagers should certainly be
supported in doing so. We should rethink the idea that all high
school students must graduate in four years. The point is not
simply to go straight forward to a better-paying job but, more
important, to find work with which one can feel productive
and reasonably content.
Charles Eliot feared that democracy would be the loser if
we insisted on forcing all students into the same college-preparatory curriculum. He was right. By doing this, we ensure that
either the courses will become weaker or many children will fail
them. This is not because many children are incapable of good
thinking or because teachers have low expectations for them.
People are different, and we all do our best thinking in areas that
interest us. Intellectual challenges can be introduced into any
well-taught subject. Instead of working toward creating rich,
relevant, and intellectually challenging courses in every program, we have endorsed the notion that a subject is automatically intellectually rich if it has regularly appeared in the
traditional curriculum. When children do poorly with that
curriculum, they may feel like failures, and when they fall into
occupations by default, they may believe it is because they were
not good enough for something better. That is the risk to
democracy we invite by insisting that equal opportunity means
the same curriculum for all.
John Gardner put it clearly in Excellence. He too extolled the
value of continued education, but he argued that this “does not
mean sending everyone to college” (1961, p. 97):
But scaling down of our emphasis on college education is only part of
the answer. Another important part of the answer must be a greatly
increased emphasis upon individual differences, upon many kinds of
talent, upon the immensely varied ways in which individual
potentialities may be realized. (1961, p. 99)

Schooling consonant with genuine democracy not only
recognizes differences. It respects and appreciates those differences.
Walt Whitman saw all this clearly. In his beautiful “Song for
Occupations,” he expressed admiration and even awe at the
enormous variety of work being done around him. In lines ringing
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with a celebration of “ordinary” people, he wrote, “the sum of all
known value and respect I add up in you whoever you are,” and
then after praising old institutions, the Union, and the
Constitution, he wrote:
I do not say they are not grand and good—for they are,
I am this day just as much in love with them as you,
But I am eternally in love with you and with all my fellows upon the
earth. (1982, p. 93)

Whitman reminds us here that democracy is not entirely defined
by principles and processes. It is fundamentally, as Dewey said, a
mode of associated living (1916, p. 87).
As we think about shaping our schools to promote genuine
democracy, we might consider vocational schools similar to those
in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. They have been highly
effective, but there are two possible drawbacks to this arrangement:
One is the practice of assigning students to these programs instead
of allowing guided choice as I’ve suggested here. Another is that
placing young people in separate buildings, often miles apart,
undermines the possibility of making the school-place into a living
democracy. Democracy is more than a set of practices, as Dewey
and Whitman pointed out. The very best, small comprehensive
high schools in 20th-century America provided real opportunities
for students from different programs to act together in music, art,
clubs, athletics, and student government. It is probably impractical
to build and maintain such schools today. We can get ideas from
many times and places, however, without trying to reproduce
exactly what others have done. The road forward is rarely behind
us. The question for us is how to create schools that will serve as
incubators of democracy.
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